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INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND  THE  CLAUSE 
"REBUS SIC STANTIBUS" 
JOHN P. BULLINGTON 
During the past quarter of a  century the increase  in com;. 
plexity  of  international  relations  and  the  growth  of  economic 
interdependence  among nations  have  required  that states  regu-
late their relations more and  more by  treaties,  since customary 
international  law  has  been  unable  to keep  abreast  of  modern 
developments.  Despite the continuous violation, both of treaties 
and of customary rules of international law,  by  all  the contest..' 
ants in the recent European war, treaties continue to be  drawn 
and signed,  and seem  on  all  sides  to  be  regarded as  effectively 
binding  the parties to them.  The importance  of  treaties  as  a 
present means of establishing peaceful intercourse and mutually 
advantageous' economic  relations  between  states makes  it worth 
while to t:econsider  the doctrine advanced and accepted by  most 
modern  writers which  would,  under varying circumstances,  au-
thorize the abrogation of treaties without the consent of all  the 
contracting parties-the mere fiat of a single state being sufficient 
to  annul  freely  contracted  obligations.  This theory  is  usually 
discussed under the heading tiThe Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause/
J1 
It is scarcely to be  doubted that treaties are ordinarily con-
summated after a due consideration by all parties of the possible 
benefits  which  may  in  the  future  accrue  to  them  through  the 
operation of the treaty under consideration.  It so happens that 
one  state often finds that it has made a bad bargain, or that it 
failed to take into consideration future contingencies that might 
operate to its disadvantage.  Thus the state may find itself bound 
either  for  a  term of years  or in  perpetuity  to  a  contract,  the 
execution  of  which  may  entail  varying  degrees  of  injury  to 
itself.  It  is  just possible  that  the  continued  existence  of  the 
state as an independent political division may be threatened.  On 
the other hand,  mere hardship may flow  from the execution of 
the treaty. 
1 See II STRUPP, WORTERBUCH  DES  VOLKERBECHTS, 336. 
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Grotius  and  the  natural  law  writers,  influenced  perhaps 
by  the rigor of the  Roman law  of  contracts,  saw no  legitimate 
relief  for  the  suffering  party,  but  would  require  the  complete 
fulfillment of the terms of the treaty.2  Vattel, however, excepted 
those  treaties  which  would  be  "pernicious"  to  the  contracting 
state, or would result in a neglect of the sovereign's duty towards 
his citizens.  S 
Since Vattel's time,  writers on  international law have  come 
to an almost  unanimous  recognition  that the clause  rebus  sic 
stantibus is  to be read into every treaty,  though pacta  sunt ser-
vanda is  still  retained as  the  rule.4  Despite this  unanimity  of 
opinion as to the existence of the clause in treaties, there is little 
agreement as to what it means or the effect that is to be given to 
it.  Some authorities would severely limit the field of its applica-
tion and deny any unilateral interpretation  of  it,!!  while  others 
would  read  into  it a  meaning  which  would  result in the  state 
being bound by the treaty only so  long as it saw fit. 6  The rea-
sons  for the existence of the clause are found by some to be  in 
the nature of the state and its sovereignty,7 by others it is deduced 
from the fact that nations make treaties only for. their own bene-
fit, B and by still  others  it is  based upon the theory that certain 
attributes  of the  state,  such  as  "freedom  of  internal  develop-
ment," "sovereignty," etc.,  are inalienable.9 
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Manifestly,  if Treitschke's theory  of  the  state as  force 1.0 
be accepted, we are compelled to admit that the state may at any 
time abrogate treaties barring the expression of that force.  The 
theory that the state cannot limit itself must also lead to the same 
conclusion.  Here, as in so many branches of the law,  the  influ-
ence  of the Austinian concept  of tlsovereignty"  has worked  in-
jury to  the free  development  of the  law.  Deifying the  sove-
reignty of the  state,  as does J  ellinek,  11  for  example,  leads  in-
evitably  to  the  conclusion  that  treaties  are  mere  "chiffons  de 
papier."  No less  disastrous would be  the results  if the theories 
of Ullman 12 and de  Louter HI were accepted.  To them the state 
can  be  bound only by  its  own will,  which logically means  that 
it cannot  be  bound  at all.  Treaties 'could  be  broken  whenever 
it seemed expedient for the state to do so.  Under such theories 
no  necessity  should  be  felt  for  implying  a  rebus  sic  stantib~tS 
clause  to  justify a  treaty  abrogation.  Fortunately,  experience 
so  effectively  denies  such  theories  that there is  little  danger of 
their continued general acceptance; yet  it cannot be  denied  that 
these highly metaphysical  concepts  of  the  state and sovereignty 
have exerted a powerful influence upon courts and legal thinkers 
alike. 14  . 
The more modern functional theories of the state,  in deny-
ing  to its government  any  such  extraordinary powers  as  were 
postulated by Bodin and Hobbes for their sovereigns, have done 
much to break down the old rigid concepts and replace them with 
more realistic and flexible  ones. 
It is thus apparent that the legal nature of treaties and the 
possibility of legally abrogating them has not been immune from 
the influence of political theory.  If the notion of the supremacy 
of the state over law be accepted, then it is useless to discuss the 
10 TREITSCHlCE,  POLITICS  (1916)  3 ff. 
11 JELLINEK,OP. cit. supra note 'j, passim. 
"ULLMAN, VOLKERRECHT,  2  auf.  (Tiibingen, 1908)  6. 
11 DE LOUTER,  LE DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  POSITIF  (Trans. from the 
Dutch)  (Oxford,  1920)  172 ff. 
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effect of treaties.  The effect will  be  only whatever a particular 
state wants it  to be,  provided,  of course,  that state is physically 
capable of enforcing its wishes.  If, on the other hand, we accept 
the theory that the state is bound by law, and particularly by inter-
national law,  as  experience impels us to do,  it becomes  most im-
portant to discover the legal effect of treaties.  In attempting to 
discover  the  validity  or non-validity  of  the rebus  sic  stantibus 
clause,  the  latter theory of the existence  of  some  law,  binding 
states, will be accepted. 
Many  states  have  found  the  theory  underlying  the  rebus 
sic  stantibus  clause  not  repugnant  to their  particular  interests, 
and have not hesitated to make use of it.·  How far this practice 
supports the validity of the theory must be determined by an ex-
amination of the precedents in the attempt to find their meaning. 
The classic example is  that of  Russia's  note  of  19131  October, 
1870,  notifying the other powers  that she no longer  considered 
herself bound by Articles  II, 13  and 14 of the Treaty of Paris 
(March 31, 1856), neutralizing the Black Sea and limiting Rus-
sia's  forces  there.  It is  noteworthy  that  Russia  assigned  as 
reasons  for  her  attempted  unilateral  abrogation  of  the  treaty 
certain  alleged  violations  of  the  treaty  by  the  other  signatory 
powers as  well as  the changed  conditions then existing.  l~  Rus-
sia's action resulted in a conference at London of the powers in-
volved,  where  a  new  treaty  was  drawn  acceding  to  Russia's 
demands.  At the same conference a protocol was signed by  all 
the parties,  including Russia,  to the effect that they recognized, 
as  a principle of international law,  that no nation  could  be  ab-
solved  from treaty duties without the consent of all the parties, 
and after an amicable agreement.16  Russia acted upon the theory 
of the rebus sic  stantibus clause,  but her act was recognized as 
legitimate by no other state. 
Few  writers,  however,  have  found  this  declaration  made 
at London  incompatible  with  their  own  theories  of the  clause. 
Certainly Russia found it no obstacle to a subsequent declaration 
that due to changed circumstances the port of Batoum would no 
U  KAUFMANN, supra note 4,  at 12 et seq. 
U  DE MARTENS,  NOUVEAU  RECEUIL  DES  TRA1TES,  Ie ser.,  t.  18, 278. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND "REBUS SIC STANTIBUS"  157 
longer be a free one,  despite Article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin. 
Here again Russia was not sufficiently sure of change of circum-
stance  alone  justifying the  breach  of  a  treaty  provision,  and 
argued  further  that the  particular  article  of the  treaty was  a 
mere gratuitous voeu on the part of Russia and therefore never 
legally  binding.1T  The instance was of such  minor importance, 
however,  that other nations concerned were not disposed  to op-
pose Russia's aims, so the incident has little value as a precedent. 
In both cases  Russia  offered  numerous  reasons  for  her  acts 
founded  on  the  "security and  dignity  of the  Empire"  and  the 
"peril" in which the respect of her engagements would put her.18 
The Treaty of Frankfort, signed in 1871  after the cessation 
of  hostilities  between  France and  Germany,  provided  that  the 
nationals  of each  of the parties  should  be  allowed  free  access 
and residence  in each  country,  and  provided  for  them  the most 
most  favored  nation  treatment.  Nevertheless,  Germany  later 
established  extremely  onerous  conditions  on  the  entrance  and 
residence of French citizens in Alsace-Lorraine.  The action was 
supported on  the ground of changed conditions-in this case the 
alleged anti-German plotting both in France and Alsace-Lorraine. 
These changes, it was argued, justified Germany in ignoring the 
treaty obligations as a measure of "self-preservation."  The pro-
tests  of France were of no avail,  and obviously that nation was 
in no position  to  make  a  forceful  demand  for the observation 
of the treaty,10 
Austria  offers  as  a  precedent  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovania in I908 despite her obligation under Article XXV 
of the  Treaty of Berlin only to occupy  the territory.  The ex-
cuse given was the changed conditions then existing in the Balkan 
states,  notably  the  fusion  of  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Rumelia. 
There was some protest by the other powers interested,  except-
ing Germany and Russia, but when the latter accepted the change 
if  See Rolin-Jacquemyns, La question d'Orient en  1885-6,  19  REv.  DE  DROIT 
INT. ET LEGIS.  COMP., 37-49. 
U  KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 13. note 2. 
1J Rolin-]acquemyns, La question des  passeports en  Alsace-Lorraine, :20 REV. 
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the matter was dropped.20  It is to be noted that in this case the 
annexation made little difference in the European situation since 
Austria-Hungary was already by  virtue of the Treaty of Berlin 
fully  occupying and  administering  Bosnia-Herzegovania. 
Again,  in 1913 the clause was invoked by  Servia in an at-
tempt  to have the treaty of  19I2 with  Bulgaria revised  on  the 
ground  that  Bulgaria had  changed  the policy  of the  war then. 
in progress  from a  defensive to an offensive  one.  It was  also 
argued that Servia had lost her Adriatic Littoral while  Bulgaria 
had  acquired  Thrace.  These  changes  in  the  situation,  it was 
said,  were  not  within  the  contemplation  of the  parties  at  the 
time the treaty was signed.  Servia, therefore, claimed the right 
to a revision of the treaty, or if that be refused, the right to uni-
laterally denounce the treaty was claimed.21 
In our commercial  treaty of  1815  with Great  Britain,  St. 
Helena  was  opened  to  us  for  commercial  purposes,  but  upon 
Napoleon being confined there, Great Britain notified the United 
States that the island  would  again be  closed,  which  policy was 
pursued until  the  death  of  Napoleon.  This was  a  mere  uni-
lateral suspension of  a  treaty  provision,  since  Great  Britain 
eventually accorded to  the  United States all the privileges pro-
vided for in the treaty.  It does  not  appear,  however,  that the 
United States admitted the right of  Great Britain even to sus-
pend the treaty because of changed circumstances.  22 
The United  States  has  not  always  allowed  treaty  obliga-
tions to stand in the way of supposed internal exigencies.  Dur-
ing the W orId War, aliens were  drafted into the  United States 
army,  despite  treaty obligations  with  many  nations  not to do 
SO.23  Some of the United States' legislation during the period 
of  1882-1893  was  considered  by  China  to  be  contrary  to  the 
treaty obligations of the United States.24  Perhaps the most  in-
.. Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 31 et seq.  The political aspects of the case are 
examined in  G.  LOWES  DICKINSON,  THE INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY,  1904-1914 
(1926)  155-185· 
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teresting case, however, concerns the demand made in  1881  upon 
Great  Britain for  a  revision  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  20 
It was pointed out that the United States had grown enormously 
during the thirty-eight years the  treaty  had  been  in  force,  and 
that the expansion of the nation made a continuance of the treaty 
incompatible with the national interest and safety under the new 
circumstances.  It  was said that 
"  this  government,  with  respect  to European 
States,  will  not  consent  to  perpetuate  any treaty that  im-
peaches  our rightful,  long-established  claim  to priority  on 
the  American  continent" 
and further that 
H  the government of  the United  States would 
feel it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful towards 
its own citizens if it permitted itself to be bound by a treaty 
which gave the same  right through the canal to a  warship 
bent on destruction that is  reserved to its own navy sailing 
for the defense of our coast and the protection of the lives 
of our people." 26 
As is  well  known,  the discussion  ended  amicably  in  the  Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty of I90I. 
The agreement of 1818 between the United States and Great 
Britain relative to  armaments on the Great Lakes was violated 
by both parties as changing conditions seemed to them to demand 
it.  Here again  we  find  "changed  conditions"  being  combined· 
with  "national  safety"  and  "interest"  as  an  excuse  for  treaty 
breach.  It is  further noteworthy that in each  instance the act 
contravening  the  treaty  stipulation  met  with  protest  from  the 
other party.  2'1 
The recent legislation in Mexico giving effect to Article z7 
of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is in conflict with Mexico's 
treaty  obligations  towards  several  countries.  This  failure  to 
observe  treaty obligations  has also  been  defended  by  invoking 
.~ III Ibid.}  130-254-
.. Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, FOREIGN  REt.ATIONS  (1881)  555. 
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the rebtts sic stantibus clause as implicit in all Mexico's treaties.28 
Articles 31  and 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, denouncing 
respectively  the treaty  of  1839  neutralizing  Belgium,  and  that 
of 1815 providing for neutral zones in Savoy, are said to be  ex-
amples of the operation of the clause.  The articles of the treaty 
do mention changed conditions,  but it is  to be  remembered that 
the nullification of the old treaties was by means of a new one, no 
implied clause in the old treaties being necessary for such  a pro-
cedure. 
Several  recent  unilateral  denunciations  of  treaties  have 
taken  place  which  would  perhaps  be  excused  if  the  rebus  sic 
stantibus be  admitted as having  a  recognized  place  in interna-
tionallaw.  Persia in  1918 declared that the treaties establishing 
spheres  of  influence  there  (particularly  the  Anglo-Russian 
treaty of 1907) were null and void.
29  In 1919 China announced 
that she would no longer be  bound by the treaties of 1913  and 
I915  with Russia and Mongolia,  it being said that the Mongo-
lian  autonomy  created  by  the  treaties  no  longer  corresponded 
to  the  latter's wishes.  An unsuccessful  protest  was  made  by 
Russia.so 
Norway,  claiming that the establishment  of the League of 
Nations together  with the  other changes  of the European situ-
ation  since  the war made  the  treaty of  1907,  guaranteeing the 
territorial integrity of Norway and requiring that nation not to 
alienate any portions  of  its  domain,  no  longer  binding,  uni-
laterally denounced it on January 8,  1924.31  With the exception 
of  Russia,  the other signatory  powers  notified  Norway that in 
the  future they  had no intention of requiring the fulfillment  of 
the  treaty.  There  was  no  indication,  however,  that  the  uni-
lateral abrogation of the treaty was accepted.  On the contrary, 
the statements of the notes that the respective governments would 
.. MacGregor, l La fraccion  I  del  Articulo 27  de  10.  Constitucion  'Viola  los 
tratados celebrados  por  Mexico  con  algunas  oociones  extral~jeras?, I  REVISTA 
MEX. DE DER.  INT., 568-593 . 
.. FAUCHILLE.  TRAITE  DE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBUC  (8e.  ed.)  Tome I, 
Partie 3. 386  . 
.. (X920)  27 REV.  GEN.  DE  DROIT  INT.  PUB.  106. 
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not  in  the  future  force  their  rights  under  the  treaty  indicate 
that they did not consider Norway's announcement as putting an 
end to it.  Here again is a simple case of a treaty being abrogated 
by the fiat of one nation because the other signatory powers had 
no sufficient interest in its continuation. 
Treaties  involving  extraterritoriality  have  sometimes  been 
the subject of debate on the matter of their abrogation by  the 
SUbjected  country  alone.32  In  the  case  of  Japan,  the  extra-
territorial privileges  were  removed  by mutu.al  consent,  and the 
cessation of the capitulations  in  Turkey was recognized  by the 
Treaty of Lausanne, though Turkey had long previously claimed 
their end.  The failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty 
of Lausanne places the United States in a somewhat anomalous 
position,  since that nation has not yet recognized that its  extra-
territorial privileges  there are at an end.  The question might 
easily arise in this case as to whether or not Turkey would still 
be bound to accord those privileges to the United States. 
The present difficulties  in China have occasioned large con-
cessions on the part of Great Britain, perhaps in anticipation of 
a  unilateral declaration by  China that the  existing extraterrito-
riality treaties were no  longer  binding  upon  her  because  of 
changed  conditions.  These  treaties  of  extraterritoriality  are 
somewhat similar in character to those establishing international 
servitudes,  and  the  several  servitudes  that  were  established  by 
the treaties that followed the late European war, such as the Kiel 
Canal, may perhaps at some future time be the cause of an invo-
cation of the clause. 
Treaties of peace raise another interesting question of inter-
national law which may with propriety be  discussed in conjunc-
ton  with the rebus sic  stantibus  clause.  It is  now  universally 
conceded  that the  doctrine  of  duress has  no  application  as be-
tween states.  The doctrine is  recognized, however, with respect 
to the agents of the state appointed to conclude a treaty.ss 
Perhaps the theory of the equality of states may have influ-
II  e.  g., Travers Twiss and  Paternostro on  extraterritoriality in Japan.  23 
REv.  DE DR.  INT. ET LEG.  COMPo  1-29; 176-200, and 25  ibid., 213-:0II9. 
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enced the acceptance of the rule that duress practiced by one na-
tion upon another will not be  recognized as such in  international 
law.  States being  equal,  one  cannot logically  impose  upon  an-
other.  This idea is  so  obviously  false  as to merit  little  atten-
tion.34 
It  is usually said that if the doctrine of duress were admitted 
in  international relations,  dire consequences  would follow.  The 
conqueror would  refuse an honorable peace  and proceed  to the 
annihilation of his  enemy,  for  otherwise  there  could be  no cer-
tainty in the future relations of the belligerents.  Stripped to the 
bone, the argument is simply that once the doctrine of duress be 
admitted there can be  no stability  in international  relations. 
The argument seems  powerful, but an examination of it in 
the  light  of  experience  somewhat  lessens  its  force.  The first 
answer that comes  to mind is that no  particular stability  is ap-
parent under the present system,  despite the claims that it tends 
to preserve the status quo.  Alsace-Lorraine has not yet  ceased 
to be a mere pawn upon the European checkerboard, and on our 
own continent the case of Tacna-Arica lends little support to the 
belief  that refusing to  allow  the  revision  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
makes for stability. 
Two  or  three  hundred  years  ago,  perhaps,  the  argument 
might have had some validity.  Ceding far off,  thinly populated 
colonial territories, the value of which  was not often fully  real-
ized, was apt to leave no such desire for revenge and the recovery 
of  the territory  as  do  territorial  cessions  at the  present  time. 
The  extreme  value  of  colonial  possessions  is  now  universally 
recognized,  and to part with them,  or to cede  territories thickly 
populated  with  one's  own  people,  such  as  Alsace-Lorraine  or 
Tacna-Arica, creates a continuing source of propaganda for war 
parties, and tends more to disturb international relations than to 
quiet  them.  It is  quite  simple  to convince  a  nation's people  of 
the holiness  of a  war waged for the  rescue  of fellow  nationals 
thrown by a  treaty into  the  jurisdiction of the  former  enemy. 
14 For a  detailed  examination of the  theory  of  the  equality  of' states  see 
EDWIN  D.  DICKINSON,  THE  EQUALITY  OF  STATES  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
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In our times, as is eloquently attested by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles,  the economic  misunderstandings  of  treaty  draftsmen 35 
may well  create a  situation by  which  the  whole  world  becomes 
affected,  and  not  merely  the  ex-belligerents  as  was  the  case 
under an international system  less  highly  integrated.  The eco-
nomic repercussions of a  faulty treaty of peace may'work such 
havoc internationally that it may  fairly be  said  that the  whole 
world has a legitimate interest in 'the revision of such improperly 
drawn treaties. 
Dangerous  international  situations  also  arise  from  treaties' 
of peace based largely on mistakes of fact imposed upon the con-
quered party.  Such a  situation has arisen  from Article 231  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  wherein  Germany  unqualifiedly 
"accepts" responsibility for the war of  1914-1918.  It now  ap-
pears that such an assertion is  probably contrary to the facts,3!! 
yet the large portions of the treaty directly based upon it continue 
to  be accepted by  the victors as valid and not susceptible  of re-
vision.  The need of revision of Article 231 and the articles based 
upon  it must be  apparent to those  who  have  inquired  into  the 
international  situation created  by  them,  yet  no method  is  seen 
to bring about  such  a  revision  unless  the  conquerors  become 
convinced  of the unwisdom of perpetuating a  probable untruth. 
So with the  treaties imposing  unusual  international  disad-
vantages upon nations,  such as the unequal  treaties with China. 
These treaties cannot be regarded as having been  freely  entered 
into by both parties, and a potentially evil international situation 
arises from them which invariably ends in a clash.  The collision 
may result in a  readjustment without the intervention  of arms, 
such  as was the case with Japan, or it may lead  to a display of 
force such as is now to be seen in China. 
It is difficult to conceive of an unjust treaty imposed  upon 
a' conquered nation,  or one too weak to resist the demands  of a 
more powerful state,  which does not offer great incentive for a 
.. See particularly  KEYNES,  THE  ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  PUCE 
(1920), and the companion volume, A  REVISION OF  THE TREATY  (I922). 
H  Consult BARNES,  THE GENESIS  OF  THE WORlll WAR  (zd ed.  1927). and 
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future breach of peace.  To argue that these treaties may not be 
revised by applying internationally the doctrine of duress because 
such  a  possibility  would  prevent  stabilization  assumes  that  the 
present system prevents the evils which are attributed to that doc-
trine.  It takes no long reading of history to perceive that what-
ever stability may be claimed by the present system is at best but 
temporary  .  .  .  a  sort  of  breathing  space  for  the  losing 
party to gather:  strength for the attempt to recoup his losses.  It 
is  not easy  to see  how  a  recognized  application  of  the  duress 
doctrine to proper cases  would  make matters any  worse.  It is 
submitted that,  in  fact,  it would  probably improve international 
relations.  It is  not  suggested  that  the  subjected  nation  uni-
laterally  ~ec1are  itself  released  .from  obligfations  imposed  by 
violence.  As in  municipal  law,  a  court  would  be  required  to 
examine the facts of each case and pronounce judgment upon the 
existence or absence of legal  duress.  The fact  of duress  could 
scarcely be denied in the case of many treaties  .  .  .  the real 
question  is  the  advisibility of the  fact  being  admitted by  inter-
national law as the basis for a legal modification of such a treaty. 
Instead of attempting to bring about the desired change by force 
of arms, as is now the only possible way,  the method of judicial 
decision  would  be  substituted. 
It might be argued that the judicial decision would no more 
definitely  decide  the  question  than  would  a  decision  by  arms. 
Perhaps there is some  force in the argument,  but  even  assum-
ing its general  validity,  an  amelioration  is believed  possible  by 
the judicial method.  We may take the classic example of Alsace-
Lorraine as.an  illustration.  Originally  Gennan,  it  has  been 
passed back and forth between Germany and France until racially 
and culturally each nation is able  to make a strong case  for its 
equities in the territory.  This is  so because after each war the 
defeated nation has  required so long a time to regain sufficient 
force to warrant an attempt to regain the lost territory that the 
conquering state has had ample time to plant and nurture its own 
people,  culture  and  language  among  the  original  inhabitants. 
With the territory thus divided  in its inhabitants,  both  nations 
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therefore,  allows  the  creation  of  an  artificial  national  interest 
where there was none  before and where none  would have been 
in the normal course of events.  Every new  Hnational  interest" 
means  a  new  possibility  for  war.  If,  for  instance,  France  is 
successful  in  imposing  a  sufficient  amount  of  her  culture  and 
people in the Saar basin before the period arrives for that  ter-
ritory  to  choose  between  France  and  Germany,  we  shall  have 
created .aI1other  Alsace-Lorraine, which would  be  far from help-
ful to the highly artificial relations already existing in Europe. 
The intervention of a court for the decision of these  ques-
tions  would  make  possible  an  equitable  restitution  before  an 
artificial,  yet continually growing,  national  interest could  be  im-
pressed  on the  disputed  territory by  the  victorious  nation.  It 
would  be  easier for France to forget the loss of territory con-
taining only  Germans  than a territory comprised  in half by  her 
own  people.  Obviously the mere decision of a court would not 
dispel the feelings which attach to the old strips of territory which 
have been handed back and forth,  but it would make it possible 
to prevent new ones  from being created. 
These suggestions  are not  offered with  the  idea that they 
will  immediately operate to improve  international  relations.  It 
must be admitted that there is little chance that the maj or nations 
woul~ be  willing  at this time  to  accept  them.  The growth of 
international law  is gradual but none the less  certain.  It is be-
lieved worth while,  however, to re-examine such ancient theories 
or principles as seem to encourage rather than discourage inter-
national strife in the hope that discussion will  be  aroused which 
may  in the  future  attain  such  volume as to  force  the gradual 
acceptance of legal theories more compatible with observed phe-
nomena,  and more conducive to the pacific relations of states. 
It seems  strange  indeed,  that writers on  international  law 
should adopt a defunct  principle  of  the  civil  law 37  allowing 
states  to escape  obligations  freely  entered  into,  yet  refuse  to 
recognize any theory which would permit the revision of treaties 
If Lammasch,  writing in II STRUPP,  WORTl<RBUCH  DES  VOLKERRECIlTS,  loco 
cit. supra note  1, remarks that while the theory was dying in the civil law. inter-
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forcibly  imposed and  often notoriously  inequitable.  While ad-
mitting that the two types of treaties should be governed by  dif-
ferent considerations, it would  seem  more conducive to the ends 
of  justice  that  the  present  system  adopted  by the  writers  be 
reversed. 
Returning now to the type of treaty freely entered into, we 
note that the kinship  of  the implied  clause  rebus  sic  stantibus 
and the  so-called  right of self-preservation  is  evident  not only 
in the words of the theorists, but in the reasons assigned by states 
attempting to escape liability under a treaty because of "changed 
circumstances."  The various theories advanced are all the result 
of a priori  reasoning,  the  c;onclusions  being based,  as  a  matter 
of fact, upon preconceived notions of political theory or analogies 
culled from private law.  Should we admit that treaties are con-
cluded with the tacit understanding written into them that rebus 
sic  stantibus,  we  still  have  to  solve  what constitutes  the rebus 
mutatis.  Here,  in effect,  is  the danger  and  the  fallacy  of the 
idea,  for it leaves to  each  party  to  determine  when  a  rebus 
mutatis has occurred.  Some writers maintain that a legitimate 
escape by way of the clause may  be had only after invitation to 
the other party or parties to confer upon the matter and a failure 
of the conference.88  Just how such a procedure would solve the 
difficulty is not shown,  for once the clause be admitted to a place 
in international law  the recalcitrant nation is not apt to  modify 
its demands to any great extent because  of the objections of the 
other party.  Such a procedure would no doubt be  more  cour-
teous  than a  simple  unilateral  declaration,  but,  it is  submitted, 
offers little  in  the way  of  a  practical  solution  of  the  problem 
involved.  In view of the language  of the  United States in the 
case of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty it is  not to be  supposed  that 
the  United  States  could  have  been  induced  by  Great  Britain 
greatly  to  modify  the  assertion  that  the  old  treaty  could  not 
stand.  England,  it  is  submitted,  agreed  to  a  revision  of  the· 
treaty,  not because of a  recognition that the treaty contained a 
tacit clause of rebus sic stantibus, but because  it was the politic 
II  ~olin-Jacquemyns in 20 REV.  DE DR.  INT. ET  LEG.  CouP. 623. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND "REBUS SIC STANTIBUS"  167 
thing to do under the  circumstances,  and  because  a  refusal on 
her  part to  negotiate  a  new  treaty  satisfactory  to  the  United 
States would probably have resulted in the loss of even those ad-
vantages  which  were  retained  by  England  under  the  Hay-
Pauncefote arrangements  .. 
Austria-Hungary  was  allowed  to  annex  Bosnia-Herzego-
vania  with  impunity,  not  because  there  was  a  tacit  clause  of 
rebus sic  sta,ntibus  in the Treaty of Berlin,  but because  Russia 
and Germany, for political reasons of their own,  refused to  join 
the other powers in a protest.  89  Likewise, Russia was in a favor-
able  position to force  her  demands  on the  other  powers  after 
the circular  letter  attempting  to  unilaterally  abrogate  the  pro-
visions of the  Treaty of Paris relative  to  the Black  Sea.  The 
protocol signed by the parties was, moreover, a categorical denial 
of  both the clause rebus  sic  stantibus and the  idea that Russia 
was  legally  disengaged  from  the  obligations  of  the  old  treaty 
. until after the act of the London Conference. 
The same type of observation might be made as to the other 
alleged  precedents for the existence of such a clause in interna-
tional law.  In fact,  no  case  is  known to the writer in which a 
nation  has  been  able  to  escape  treaty  obligations  because  the 
other party recognized the clause rebus sic  stantibus as  implied 
in the  treaty by  international law.  Rules  of  international  law 
do  not  grow  from  mere  unilateral  declarations  of  nations,  no 
matter how long practiced, when those declarations are uniformly 
denied by other states.  The opinions of the writers, even though 
they  be unanimous,  cannot effectully create a  rule  of law  when 
the supposed rule is uniformly denied  in practice.  So far as is 
known,  the  clause  has  never  been  considered  by  an  arbitral 
tribunal or other  international court,  though there is  dictum  in 
the case of Russia v.  Turkey to the effect that intervening force 
majeure would be a good plea to a suit upon a treaty obligation.40 
•• G.  LOWES  DICKINSON,  supra note 20, 168-181, 
•• SCOTT,  THE  HAGUE  COURT  REpORTS  3I5.  Kaufmann, supra  note 4,  at 58, 
states that the Supreme Court of Switzerland has recognized the principle.  The 
United States Court of Claims recognized it in some dicta in the French Spolia-
tion  cases,  citing  Woolsey  and  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  case.  Hooper  v; 
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Since the recognition in international law of such an implied 
clause is at least  highly  questionable,  it is  well  to examine  the 
claims  for its necessity or desirability.  It has been said that no 
nation can intend to bind itself  in perpetuity,  and that such  an 
idea is  incompatible with  state  sovereignty,  and the very nature 
of the state:H  An analogy  is  foOOd  in  the private law of con-
tracts which refuses to give effect to contracts of service for Hfe, 
and the argument that the state is incapable of alienating certain 
of its functions  may find  some  analogy in  the implied  constitu;. 
tional  limitations  on  the  alienation  of  the  public  domain.42 
Analogies  drawn  from  private  law  in support of  international 
law  theory,  while often useful,  are by  no  means controlling or 
necessarily desirable.  What is useful and possible in private law 
is not  always  so  in  international law.  VVere  we,  for  example, 
to accept the  first  analogy,  treaties  prC!viding  for  international 
services in perpetuity would  be voidable immediately at the will 
of the obligor.  What then,  for instance,  would become  of the 
obligations assumed in the Danish sound which Denmark under-
took for a  money consideration paid by  t~e other powers who 
denied  Danish proprietary claims  in  those  waters.48  May Ger-
many repudiate her Kiel  Canal obligations at any time  because 
she could not bind herself to furnish services perpetually?  May 
Panama at any time repudiate the obligations she undertook with 
respect to the Panama Canal because she could not legally assume 
those obligations?  What value would there by in concluding the 
proposed  treaty  with  France  outlawing  war  between  the  two 
nations if it be impossible  for a state to perpetually bind  itself? 
It is submitted that nations can and do obligate themselves with-
out limit of time, and that to read into international law an out-
worn rule of private law,  would necessitate such a large number 
of exceptions as to reduce the rule to a mere series of words. 
The  second  analogy,  to  the  effect  that  nations  may  not 
alienate certain attributes--usually designated by  the writers as 
<1 DE LoUTER,  supra note I3. at 5IO. 
a ct. Illinois Central Ry. v.  Illinois,  I46 U. S. 387  (I892).  But see DANA, 
WHEATON'S  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  50. 
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"sovereignty" or things held in "trust" for the people of the state 
-is  also of such vagueness as to make it practically unworkable. 
The element of unilateral  determination  of  treaty  rights  and 
duties  still  remains,  for  the constitutional  laws  of the various 
countries are by no means  uniform as to what mayor may not 
be  alienated by the legislature,  and it is  thus probable that each 
nation would search its  own  municipal  law  for  analogy  and 
would  demand  that its  own concept  be  accepted.  Under  such 
rules  the treaties  now  in  force  between  the United  States and 
several  of the  Central American states would  be  terminable  at 
the will  of any of them,  inasmuch as  the treaties provide' for  a 
certain  derogation  of their sovereignty.  It is  is  believed  that 
many of the writers who assert such a doctrine had in mind the 
ancient practice of secret treaties upon which the public was held 
in ignorance.  This, of course,  would  not include those  writers 
of the  German Polizeistoot  school.  It was  probably  thought 
inequitable  that some  monarch,  in  pursuit  of  his  own political 
scheming,  should alienate the public domain,  or perpetually bind 
his people  by  an onerous treaty.  With this idea was combined 
the  changing  ideas  of  the  nature  of  the  state  and  sovereign 
responsibility.  It is  not here maintained that the day  of secret 
treaties is past, despite the pious assertions of League diplomats, 
but it is unquestionable that under the present system of parlia-
mentary ratification of treaties it would be difficult to make the 
old  reasoning support the doctrine.  Witness the action of the 
Swiss  public not so many years ago  when a  railway treaty was 
negotiated  with  Germany  and  Italy  giving  the  latter:  nations 
rights unlimited in time over Swiss territory which the Swiss pub--
lic  thought to be  detrimental to the public  interest.  44  So much 
for the private law analogies offered.  They are,  of course,  not 
technically concerned with the clause rebus sic stantibus, but have 
been  offered as  evidence that there must be  some sort of limita-
.. Scelle, 20 REv.  GEN.  DE DR.  INT.  PUB. 484-505, particularly pages 499-500, 
where he maintains the theory that the clause operates when the end sought by 
the parties is  no longer obtainable through the treaty, and defends  the right of 
either  nation  to  decide  for  itself  when  the treaty ceases  to contribute to that 
end, even in the face of armed conflict.  Cf. PUDIER-FoDERE,  op. cit. supra note 
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tion implied in  treaties to prevent them from being permanently 
effective. 
Let us suppose for a moment that international law actually 
does  read  the clause  into treaties.  What will  be  the practical 
effect  of it?  Taken  literally,  any  appreciable  change  of  the 
political or economic  conditions  existing at the time  the  treaty 
was  signed  would  entail  its  extinction if either  of  the  parties 
desired it.  But if  we are to believe the writers, the clause doesn't 
mean that.  Only certain types of changes,  it seems,  would  jus-
tify a nation in claiming release from treaty obligations by means 
of the clause.  Thus if the treaty becomes incompatible with the 
constitutional  and  private law  growth  of the  nation,  conditions 
have  "changed"  sufficiently  for  a  legitimate  invocation  of  the 
clause.40  Or,  if the circumstances  become  so  changed  that the 
observance of the treaty would be  inconsistent with the so-called 
right of "self-preservation," the clause would come into play and 
relieve  the sufferer.46  Thus an ambiguous  clause  is  defined  in 
even more shadowy and disputable phrases.  The danger of sanc-
tioning'such an indefinite and indefinable clause in the absence of 
courts charged with delimiting its  meaning must be  recognized. 
The above  definitions  of rebus  mutatis  have  called  forth 
both exceptions  and  denials.  To some  the  changes  interfering 
with internal legal or economic growth do not constitute a true 
rebus mutatis-the change  must be  such  as  to cause the  treaty 
to become a veritable threat at the very existence of the state,46
a 
while others would merely distinguish between those internal in-
stitutions which  represent an  expression  of the droit  necessaire 
(i.  e.,  the state's  idea  of a  proper  political  theory),  and  mere 
administrative changes.46b  S~i11 others assert that it may be  in-
.. HEFFTER, DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  (4e ed.) 22I; Olivi, D'un Cas Controverse 
de  Cessatio1~ de  la  Force  Obligatoire des  Trmtes blternationau%, 23 REV.  DE  DR. 
INT.  ET LEG.  COMP.,  590-609.  . 
•• HALL,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  (7th ed.  1917)  361-370, esp.  369.  Note that 
Hall severally  criticizes  Reffter,  RautefeuilIe,  Bluntschli  and  Fiore  for  their 
"high sounding generalities," and then offers as  a yardstick the "right of self-
preservation" of states,  a  right which  has  exactly the  meaning  that each  state 
desires to give it  . 
... DESPAGNET-DEBOECK,  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC  (4e  ed.)  707-710. 
Rolin-]acquemyns in 20 REV.  DE DR"  ETC.,  615-623. 
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voked  only  when 'the  "highest  interests"  of  the  state  are  at 
stake.  47  Most of the writers admit that the  recognition of the 
clause is dangerous, but would not on that account do away with 
it  entirely.  It has been  said  that  if  the  treaty  were  "loyally" 
discussed  by  both  parties,  the  result  would  be  a  condliation of 
the opposite extremes of the doctrine and the assignment of rea-
sonable limits to the treaty.48  It has also been assumed that cir-
cumstances  of  such  a  character as  would  justify the  invocation 
of  th~ clause would  be  such  that  the  benefited  party  would 
readily acquiesce in the obligor's demands.49  To the first  state-
ment  it  may  be  answered  that  an  amicable  agreement  may  be 
reached  through a  conference of the parties because. the  nation 
demanding release still  retains a  considerable bargaining power, 
or  because  the  benefited  party find  it politic  to  agree  to  a  re-
vision.  The second  statement  assumes  that the  clause  will  be 
invoked  only in "proper" cases,  those cases  being such as  would 
appeal to the sense of justice of any state.  In view of past prac-
tice  the assumption  would  seem  rather too sanguine.  In either 
case,  however,  the necessity of the clause rebus  sic  stantibus is 
not apparent.  If the obligor is  able to bargain himself out of a 
bad position, or if the obligee for political or even equitable mo-
tives agrees to release  the obligor  from his  excessive burden,  it 
is difficult to see  just what the disputed clause has to do with it. 
It does not appear that the results would be  any different if the 
clause had never been  heard  Of.IiO  The writer  is  unacquainted 
with  any case  where  a  treaty has  been  revised  as a  matter  of 
legal right  . 
.. SCHMIDT, tiBER DIE  VOLKERRECHTLICHE CUUSULA REBus  SIC STANTmus 
(Leipzig, 19(7)  25.  Schmidt, however,  denies  any  legal  validity to the clause. 
48 Cavaglieri,La FUlIziolls della Clausola Rebus Sic Stantibus tlei Tra.ttati 111-
ternaziollali, 71 ARCHIVIO  GIURIDICO,  106-140  • 
.. Crandal~ op.  cit. supra note 21, at 441. 
50 For example, it is not uncommon for the legislature of a state to pass laws 
contravening treaty obligations,  thus  forcing  the  governmental  agency  charged 
with foreign relations either to nullify the legislation, if possible, or to negotiate 
new treaties.  This was done by the United States when the Lafollette Seamen's 
Acts. made it impossible  for the executive to  comply with the treaties requiring 
the United States to return all deserting seamen to their ships.  The nation whose 
rights under the treaty are injured may demand some other compensatory privi-
lege as  a price for agreeing to a new treaty, or the new treaty may be agreed to 
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Two formidable  objections  to  the  clause  have  never  been 
adequately  refuted,  and  it  is  believed  that  no  such  refutation 
can be made.  First, the usual treaty is now concluded for a cer-
tain term of years, with some  type  of "option"  clause  attached 
for renewal or  denouncement.  The  parties  to  such  treaties 
(usually  commercial  treaties)  customarily  take  into  considera-
tion  possible  economic  or political  changes  in  the  future,  and 
limit  the  obligatory  term  to such  a  period  as they  deem  safe 
for  their individual interests.  It is  difficult to conceive  of any 
eventuality  short  of  war,  which,  under  such  a  treaty,  would 
even equitably entitle the obligor to relief.51  The treaty is made 
for a specified space of time for the very purpose of permitting 
periodic adjustments  to meet changed circumstances unforeseen 
by the parties. 
The second  objection is that nations  entering  into treaties 
are not unaware of the disputed clause,  and there would be little 
objection to the actual insertion of it into the treaty if the par-
ties  intended  to contract in  that  fashion.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
highly  improbable  that any  nation  would  be  willing  to sign  a 
treaty with the bare  clause  included,  since  it would  be  fatal  to 
the very purpose of the usual treaty-to provide a binding and 
dependable  delimitation  of the rights and  duties  of  the parties 
with respect to a certain thing, or for the accomplishment of a 
certain objective.  To find  by  implication  that the parties must 
have understood such a  clause  to  be  part of the contract there-
fore does considerable violence to ordinary credence. 
Furthermore, in  actual practice,  the theories heretofore ad-
vanced  would  tend to make  pacta  sunt servanda  the exception 
rather than the rule.  The  nation  desiring  to be  freed  of the 
burdensome treaty might either attempt to do so by simple dec-
laration, or might request a conference with the other party for 
a  revision  of  the  treaty.  In either case  the obligee  would  be 
G1 The Norway  case  (supra  note  31)  can  scarcely  be defended  upon  any 
grounds of necessity.  The treaty in question ran only for ten-year periods, and 
was  susceptible  of  denouncement  by  notice  two  years  before  the  end  of  any 
period.  By  waiting  two years  Norway could  have  denounced  the treaty con-
formably with its terms.  It does  not appear  that the two-year wait would have 
worked any injury :whatever upon Norway.  The case is  but a sample of the use-
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placed  in the position of having to convince  the  obligor  of his 
erroneous asstunptions.  That is to say,  the existence of a legal 
unilateral  means  of  escape  from  an  onerous  treaty  obligation 
would tend to encourage  nations  in  seeking  that escape,  and a 
certain air of righteousness might be lent  to their:  actions.  An 
opportunity would be afforded for the breach of a treaty without 
acknowledging it.  This would be true,  of course,  only so long 
as  nations refuse to admit the possibility of  judicial determina-
tion  of questions  said  to  involve  the  national  "honor" 52  or 
"safety",  and that such  judicial determination  may  come  after 
an  automatic  submission  of the  disputed  question  to an  inter-
national court. 
As has been noted above, the more noted cases involving the 
clause  in  Europe  have  been  concerned  with  treaties  involving 
the so-called balance of power.  The existence of such a system 
may  have had a  great  deal  to do  with  the  development  of  the 
notion that treaties were to be  understood rebus sic stantibus.53 
Neutrality treaties have  in  Europe been  solely  for the  purpose 
of preserving the "equiUbre/
J  so that the clause might well serve 
to excuse  Germany's  failure to observe  the treaty of  r839 neu-
tralizing Belgium.  The later close union of Russia and France 
with the subsequent co-operation of Great Britain left Gennany 
with  potential enemies on  both the east and west  frontiers.  A 
strong argument could be made that this change in the grouping 
of the European"powers was such a change as to make the treaty 
no longer binding under the rebus sic stantibus theory.54 
"See PERLA, WHAT IS NATIONAL HONOR?  (1919). 
II Cf. Russia's report to the First Peace Conference at the Hague, where it 
was said: 
"  •  .  .  the mutual rights and duties  of states are determined by the 
totality of what we  call  political  treaties,  which are nothing  but the tem-
porary expression of chance and transitory relationship between the various 
national  forces.  The treaties  restrict  the  parties  so  long as  the  political 
conditions  under  which  they  were  produced  remain  unchanged.  Upon  a 
change in these conditions the rights and obligations  foHowing  from  these 
treaties necessarily change also" ; 
in  SCOTI',  REpORTS  TO  THE  HAGUE CONFERENCES  (I9I7)  97. 
"The Treaty of Versailles, by Article 3I, ended the neutrality of Belgium. 
it being said that it was no longer compatible with changed conditions.  The dif-
ference between this treaty nullification and that of Germany is not so much one 
of force of reason, but of method.  The one was unilateral and illegal, the other 
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It is submitted  that  the  clause  rebus sic  stantibt£s  as  sus-
tained by the majority of writers is so pregnant with danger as 
to outweigh any considerations of possible  benefit  which  might 
be  derived  from  it in  exceptional  cases.  We may  even  recog-
nize the possibility of cases arising where the obligor should be 
released  from  his  obligation  without  thereby  sanctioning  the 
clause.  Is there no other way by which these exceptional  cases 
may  be  settled  without  seriously  undermining  the  sanctity  of 
treaty  obligations?  Article  19  of  the  Pact  of  the League  of 
Nations  recognizes  that  treaties. may  be  in  need  of  revision, 
and provides that in  such  cases  the matter:  shall  be  handled  by 
the Assembly,  which is,  of course,  the poorest means at the dis~ 
pasal of the League for such a purpose.  The one  attempt that 
has been made to bring Article 19 into play has met with failure 
and demonstrated the hopelessness  of the Assembly as  a  means 
for the revision of faulty treaties.55  Article 6 of Project No.  21 
of the American Institute of International Law/56 however, pro-
vides no means of putting an end  to a treaty other than a  ful-
fillment  of the  obligation;  the  expiration  of  the  agreed  time; 
the disappearance of one of the parties,  subject to the rights of 
succession; or by renunciation 011  the part of the nation in whose 
favor the obligation was  created.  Little assistance is  therefore 
to be found  from these sources. 
Some assistance may be  found in the war-time development 
of the English doctrine of "frustration" in contracts, in which a 
tendency  is  shown  towards  recognizing  economic  impossibility 
as  well  as absolute  impossibility  as  a  reason  for  the  court  to 
grant a rescission of the contract.57  This is quite similar to the 
.. Bolivia attempted to bring the treaty of  1904 with Chile  before the  As~ 
sembly, but upon an unfavorable committee report, the demand was  withdrawn. 
The consensus of opinion seems  to  be  that no treaty may be considered without 
the  unanimous  consent  of the Assembly.  Obviously the nation  not  wishing  to 
revise a treaty can always effectively block the efforts of the other party to that 
end.  The matter  is  studied in detail  by  GOELLNER,  LA  REVISION  DES  TRAITES 
SOUS  I.E REGIME  DE LA  SOCIETE  DES  NATIONS  (Paris, 1925). 
M  (1926)  20 AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW,  Special  Supple~ 
ment,349.  . 
OT See,  for example, Metropolitan Water Board v.  Dick Kerr & Co.,  [1918] 
A.  C.  II  9,  where  a  contract was  held to be  completely  inoperative  because  of 
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continental  doctrine  of force  majeure}  and  as  has  been  noted 
above,  we  are  provided  with  at least  a  dictum  of  the  Hague 
Tribunalthat the doctrine of force  majeure is recognized by  in· 
ternational law.  The meaning  and  extent  of the  doctrines  of 
force  'J1U1.jeure  and frustration are reasonably clear,  and are not 
susceptible of being  interpreted in any  such  free  manner.as the 
clause  rebus  sic  stantibtf,s.~8  Further,  the  demanding  party 
would not by these doctrines be placed in the advantageous posi· 
tion made possible by tqe rebtts sic stantibus theory,  since there 
could  be  no  widely  diverging  views  as to the  meaning  of the 
doctrines.  But even though the theories above mentioned would 
furnish  a  reasonably  clear and  stable measure for the  determi-
nation of liability under a treaty, we must still recognize that the 
intervention of an international court is  necessary  for a judicial 
determination of the rights of the parties.  Unfortunately nations 
are  still  unwilling  to  submit  to  such  courts  matters  pertain-
ing to the national "honor" and "safety," though as a matter of 
fact  the  "honor"  spoken  of is  often translatable  into  terms of 
dollars or pounds sterling.  It is  probable,  therefore,  that until 
education  in  international  matters  has  reached  the stage  where 
the idea of a state being called to the bat: of justice is no longer 
shocking to national sensibilities, a judicial determination ad hoc 
of whether or not a treaty continues to be binding on the parties 
is not within the realm of probability.  Unless the possibility and 
method' of revising  a  treaty be  specifically  decided  beforehand, 
any  demand  made  for  its. later  revision  will  necessarily  be 
founded on the national honor and safety. 
The matter is  not hopeless,  however,  and  there is  still  one 
solution for treaties to be made in the future which seems  to be 
formance, even though the contract provided for mere suspension in case of such 
a contingency.  For a  brief  comparison of the English and American practice, 
see  Conlen, The Doctrine of Frustration as  Applied to  Contracts,  (1921)  70 U. 
OF  P  A. L. REv.  87. 
G8 If the demanding party is  able to support his  demand for a  rescission  of 
the tt.'eaty  with the doctrine of rebus sic stantiblts,  which is  necessarily a  vague 
concept,  the obligee  is  placed in  the position of having to rebargain in  the  at-
tetnpt to save whatever advantages he can from the old treaty or lose all of them 
with  the  alternative  possibility  of  further  loss  through  reprisals  or war.  If, 
however, the demanding party is able to produce no  such accepted doctrine, that 
party actually has the burden of showing bona  fides  and a sound case in fact. 176  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
within the realm of the possible.  Under the present system, any 
sort of implied clause or condition in  treaties imports a  danger 
not present under  like circumstances in  municipal law.  Unilat-
eral determination of treaty obligations makes possible, and even 
probable,  either  economic  or  armed  warfare,  either  of  which 
would .be of far more serious consequences than the observation 
of the onerous  treaty provision  would  have  been.  It is  there-
fore imperative for the peaceful development of nations that the 
rigor of the rule pacta sunt servanda be  retained.  The remedy 
of  implying the clauserebtts sic  stantibus  is  worse  than  what 
little evil  might result from a  rigid  observation of the  rule.  It 
would,  however,  in no way  impair  the  force  of the  rule  if the 
parties, at the time of making the treaty, were to insert a clause 
providing that intervening  force  majeure  or frustration  would 
entitle either party to a revision or revocation of the treaty, and 
that in case of dispute the matter be settled by sOme international 
judicial body.  It is  submitted that nations  might be  willing to 
accept such a clause in treaties, since there is very little difference 
of opinion as to what constitutes a force majeure or frustration, 
so  that  they  could  contract  with  a  considerable  assurance  of 
knowing what the contract meant.  Such a clause would also re-
fute a later claim to the existence of an  imp~ied clause of wider 
scope.  It would  forestall  the  invocations  of national  "honor" 
and "safety" so  often heard,  and which  almost  invariably pre-
vent  a  judjcial  determination  of  the  question.59  If  the matter 
be entirely settled beforehand, no opportunity is left for justiciable 
issues  to  ripen  into  political  questions.  Thus  one  type  of 
troublous  question  would  be  taken  out  of  the  category  called 
"political"  and  added  to  that  described  as  "lega1."  60  Every 
question taken from the former category and placed in the latter 
.. No real  objection on the part of a  nation is perceived to  the  submission 
of a  question  of  force  majeure  or  frustration  to  a  court, if the matter  were 
agreed  on  beforehand.  Such  an agreement  at the  time  of  making  the treaty 
would  raise no questions  of  national  honor,  and  if a  question  later  arose,  the 
automatic submission to a court would forestall the dispute which usually results 
in a refusal to arbitrate because the nation's  "honor" has then become  Involved . 
.. See the analysis  of  BORCHARD,  THE  DISTINCTION  BE1'WEEN  LEGAL  AND 
POLITICAL QUESTIONS  (1924), reprinted from the  PROCEEDINGS  OF THE  AMERI-
CAN  SOCIETY OF  INTERNATIONAL LAW (April 24-26, 1924). INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND "REBUS SIC STANTIBUS"  177 
is an added step towards the establishment  of  law as the final 
means of settling disputes between states. 
The procedure  suggested  would  require  nations  in  treaty 
matters to stand squarely on the basis  of law  or outlawry-the 
equivocal and self-righteous position made possible by the theory 
of the clause rebus sic stantibus would no longer be open to them. 